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Finally, the court addressed Katie John's argument that "public lands" under ANILCA extends to waters appurtenant to land allotted by the ANAA to
an Alaska Native. The 1906 ANAA and its successor, the ANCSA of 1971,
granted the Secretary of the Interior the power to allot a 160-acre piece of
unappropriated land to an Alaskan Native. In the 1999 Rules, the Secretaries
did not list waters appurtenant to these allotments as "public lands." Instead,
the Secretaries delegated to the Federal Subsistence Board ("FSB") the authority to, decide this issue. The FSB decided to identify which, if any, of these
waters fall within "public lands" on a "case-by-case basis." In opposition, the
State argued that none of the Native allotments, which were conveyed out of
the public domain, could give rise to federal reserved water rights. However,
the court asserted that it did not need to decide that issue to conclude the Secretaries reasonably delegated the difficult and complex matter to the FSB.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision that (i) the
Secretaries appropriately implemented Katie John land the federal reserved
water rights doctrine; (ii) ANILCA's rural subsistence priority can apply to
appurtenant waters; (iii) the Secretaries properly excluded certain lands, including lands upstream and downstream from federal reserved land, from the
definition of "public lands;" and (iv) agencies may determine reserved water
rights for Alaska Native Settlements on a "case-by-case basis."
Emdy Miler

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Fla. v. United States, 716 F.3d 535 (11th
Cir. 2013). (holding (i) the Florida Indian Land Claims Settlement Act created
no obligation for the United States Army Corps of Engineers to administer its
flood management system in a way that protects and does not interfere with
the Miccosukee Tribe's rights of use and enjoyment for leased and reservation
land, and (ii) the Miccosukee Tribe failed to adequately state due process and
equal protection claims).
The Miccosukee Tribe of Indians of Florida ("Tribe") brought this appeal
against the United States claiming the Army Corps of Engineers' ("Corps")
management of the Central and South Florida Project ("C&SF Project")
caused extreme flooding of tribal lands in violation of its rights under the Constitution and the Florida Indian Land Claims Settlement Act ("FILCSA").
Several pieces of legislation influenced the actions and outcome of the
case. Congress passed the Swamp and Overflowed Lands Act of 1850 in order
to bring development to the Everglades of Florida. The Overflowed Lands Act
allowed the establishment of a system of canals, levees, locks, and dams to
encourage a large migration of individuals and to bring development to the
South Florida area. However, the system Florida established proved inadequate to protect against future disaster. Congress then passed the Flood Control Act of 1948, which created the C&SF Project and enlisted the Corps to
work in conjunction with state and local agencies to better implement the project. Though considered a state project, the Corps maintained operational
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control over critical areas of the C&SF Project, including the area at issue. The
C&SF Project addressed three major concerns: preserving the Everglades,
providing a water supply, and improving flood protection to South Florida.
Prior to the C&SF Project, the land in and around the Everglades was commercially useless. The canals, water gates, and pump systems the C&SF Project constructed have kept much of the land drained and useable for agricultural and residential purposes.
The C&SF Project encompasses three geographical areas: the Everglades
Agricultural Area, the Water Conservation Area ("WCA"), and Everglades
National Park ("Park"). In order to keep the Agricultural Area usable, the
Corps drains water from this land into the WCA and, when necessary, releases
the water to flow south into the Park. The contested area lies within the WCA.
The WCA consists of three reservoirs: WCA 1, WCA 2, and WCA 3 (divided into WCA 3A and 3B). Along the southern border of WCA 3 the Corps
installed a series of four gates, referred to as the S-12 gates, to control water
flow from the reservoir into the Park. The Corps maintains exclusive control
over the flow of water from the reservoir into the Park and with this control
comes the ability to influence the ecosystem of the Park. This appeal questions
the propriety of the Corps' decisions concerning the operation of the S-12
gates.
The Corps determines the flow of water from the reservoir to the Park
based on the water regulation schedules it promulgates, taking into consideration the maximum and minimum water levels for various areas of the project
and the authorized purposes of the C&SF Project These schedules consist of
set times to open or close certain gates and channels. The Corps may apply its
discretion and depart from the schedule under certain circumstances, such as
a threat to an endangered species or as a means to maintain the health and
safety of the Tribe. When creating the schedules, the Corps must consider the
Endangered Species Act of 1973 ("ESA"). Previously, the Corps' water regulation schedules caused severe damage to the Cape Sable seaside sparrow's
("sparrow") habitat, thereby threatening the sparrow's population. In response,
Congress implemented three experimental programs in 1983, 1999, and 2002.
The 2002 program, the Interim Operation Plan for the Protection of the Cape
Sable Seaside Sparrow ("IOP"), remains the current operating plan. The IOP
works to create continuous dry periods ideal to accommodate the sparrow's

nesting cycles.
The Everglades area also serves as home to the Tribe. The Tribe holds
rights to land in the Everglades held in trust by the federal government ("reservation land") and land provided through a perpetual lease ("leased land") from
the State of Florida.
Two treaties established the reservation land: the Treaty of Camp
Moultrie of 1823 and the Treaty of Payne's Landing of 1832. These treaties
required native groups in Florida to relinquish all claims to territory in Florida
and attempted to create a reservation in central Florida. The treaties thus gave
the United States control of the Everglades, which Congress transferred to
Florida in 1850. Congress regained control over much of the land through the
establishment of Everglades National Park in 1934. Florida then worked to
establish a permanent reservation for the Seminole and Miccosukee tribes.
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Ultimately, the United States established the Miccosukee reservation in
Broward County on land within the northwest area of WCA 3A.
The Tribe gained additional land interests in the Everglades through lease
agreements with Florida. The original land lease of 1960 was largely impermanent and rested on uncertain legal foundations. The Tribe challenged its legitimacy in 1979. Following several negotiations and public hearings, the Tribe
and Florida entered into settlement and lease agreements in 1982 in which the
Tribe relinquished all rights, tide, interests, or claims to possession of any public or private lands or natural resources in Florida. Further, the Tribe conceded that the rights of use and enjoyment granted were not absolute but were
subject to the water management activities of the South Florida Water Management District ("SFWMD"), which served as the local sponsor of the C&SF
Project, and of the Corps. In return, Florida agreed to grant the Tribe a perpetual lease interest, including a right to use and enjoy 143,620 acres bordering the reservation land.
Because the settlement and lease agreements resulted in extinguishment of
tribal land claims, both needed congressional approval to take effect. In order
to approve these agreements, Congress passed FILCSA in 1982. FILCSA
approved the settlement and lease agreements and granted the Tribe rights to
enjoy and use the leased land. In exchange, the Tribe relinquished any aboriginal right, title, interest or claim to land. FILCSA also recognized that the
Tribe received no greater rights or interests outside of those explicitly stated in
the lease agreement. In addition, FILCSA transferred the reservation land
from Florida to the United States ("Trustee Deed") and expressly subjected
the land to all rights, easements, and reservations favoring SFWMD and the
Corps. Ultimately, FILCSA granted Florida and the United States the ability to
continue water management activities on the reservation and leased land without significant hindrance from the Tribe.
This case was first brought before the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Florida ("district court") in 2008, after a fire in the Park
threatened the sparrow habitat and required a deviation from the regulation
schedules that resulted in flooding on tribal lands. The Tribe Chairman contacted the Corps and requested that it mitigate the flooding by keeping the
gates open beyond the regular scheduled closure date, but the Corps, after
review, denied the request. The Tribe brought four counts arising from the
Corps' alleged mismanagement of the C&SF Project. The four counts included (i) a violation of the Tribe's rights under FILCSA, (ii) a violation of the
Tribe's due process rights, (iii) an action under FILCSA for a writ of mandamus against the Corps, and (iv) a violation of the Tribe's equal protection
rights. In response to all four counts, the Corps filed a motion to dismiss for
failure to state a claim for relief. In support of the motion to dismiss, the
Corps argued any rights granted in the lease agreement and Trustee Deed
were subject to the express provisions of those agreements. From the Corps'
perspective, the agreements provided easements to the SFWMD and the
Corps superior to the rights granted to the Tribe, meaning the Corps was immune from the Tribe's suit. The district court dismissed the first three claims
and granted summary judgment on the fourth. The Tribe appealed the district
court's decision to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
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("court") seeking a decision -requiring the Corps to protect and not interfere
with its rights of use and enjoyment of leased and reservation land.
The court considered all four counts on appeal. As a general matter, the
court noted that the allegations did not comply with the requirements of Ashcroft v. Iqbal because the allegations were general, vague, and conclusory
statements. However, the court concluded it could discern enough from the
allegations to dispose of the appeal.
Count One and Count Three alleged the Corps had a duty to protect and
avoid interference with the Tribe's rights of use and enjoyment under
FILCSA. The counts differed, however, in the remedy sought. The Tribe
sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief from the Corps' actions in
Count One and sought a writ of mandamus in Count Three. The Tribe alleged its right of use and enjoyment originated in the settlement and lease
agreements ("agreements") and the Trustee Deed, while the obligation to protect and not interfere originated in FILCSA. The court found this interpretation of FILCSA erroneous. The language of FILCSA only approves the Lease
Agreement and creates the reservation through the Trustee Deed. FILCSA
does not create an obligation to protect or avoid interference with the Tribe's
rights, nor does the language of either the Lease Agreement or the Trustee
Deed create such an obligation. The court acknowledged that the Tribe might
find this obligation in the Corps' responsibility under its easements to conduct
lawful water management activities. The Tribe may have considered the flooding of tribal lands to be beyond the scope of the Corps' responsibilities, equating the flooding to trespassing on tribal lands. The court ultimately dismissed
this notion as the easements were not on record and therefore a determination
of the scope was not possible. Ultimately, the court dismissed both Counts
One and Three as insufficient to state a claim.
Count Two alleged the Corps deprived the Tribe of property without due
process. The court agreed the Corps could not take all or part of the Tribe's
property granted under the agreements and Trustee Deed without due process, but questioned what process was due to the Tribe. The court presented
three factors a plaintiff must allege to claim denial of property without due
process of law: (i) deprivation of a constitutionally protected property interest,
(ii) governmental action, and .(iii) constitutionally inadequate process. The
court found the Tribe failed to allege what process was adequate before the
Corps could flood its lands. As such, the Tribe failed to adequately establish a
due process claim.
Count Four alleged the Corps deprived the Tribe of equal protection under the law through its water management practices. The Tribe argued they
were due protections under the Fourteenth Amendment (which the court corrected to refer to the Fifth Amendment) and that the acts of the United States
deprived the Tribe of these protections. Further, the Tribe argued that as a
discrete and insular minority, it was unable to take advantage of the majoritarian protections of the political system. The court again found the allegations in
Count Four to be so vague and ambiguous that it would have to make multiple
assumptions to determine a violation of equal protection rights, including the
identity of the beneficiaries of the allegedly discriminatory flooding management The court refused to entertain such assumptions and found the allega-
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tions to be insufficient to overcome a motion to dismiss or a motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision to dismiss the
claims arising under FILCSA and the due process clause of the Constitution,
as well as its decision to grant summary judgment for the equal protection
claim.
LIbe Parker

STATE COURTS
COLORADO
In re Water Rights of the City and Cnty. of Denver v. City of Englewood,
304 P.3d 1160 (Colo. 2013) (holding (i) municipality may use properly quantified transmountain lawn irrigation return flows ("LIRFs") as substitute supply
for decreed appropriative rights of exchange, by virtue of the fact that such
LIRFs are legally indistinguishable from reusable imported transmountain
effluent; and (ii) junior appropriator cannot claim injury based solely upon
municipality's proper operation of its decreed exchanges).
In 2004 the City and County of Denver ("Denver") filed an application for
determination of water right in the Colorado District Court for Water Division
1 ("water court"). Denver requested approval of its use of properly quantified
transmountain LIRFs as a substitute supply of water for its appropriative rights
of exchange decreed in Civil Action ("C.A.") 3635. The C.A. 3635 decree,
which the Colorado District Court for Douglas County issued in 1972, rests
upon Denver's intent to effectuate exchanges on the South Platte River of public stream water as substitute supplies for appropriated water supplied or taken
by Denver. In 1992 the Colorado Supreme Court ("Court") interpreted the
C.A. 3635 decree in City and County of Denver v. City of Englewood and
approved imported Colorado River water and imported transmountain water
returning to the South Platte River as wastewater effluent ("transmountain effluent") as permitted substitute supplies for the C.A. 3635 exchanges.
Just as it did in 1992, Englewood filed a statement of opposition to Denver's 2004 application. In response, Denver filed a C.R.C.P. 56(h) motion for
determination of questions of law, requesting the water court to decide (i)
whether Denver could use properly quantified LIRFs as a substitute supply of
water for the C.A. 3635 exchanges, and (ii) whether a junior appropriator within the exchange reach could claim injury based solely on the use of such
LIRFs as a substitute supply source.
Addressing the Rule 56(h) motion, the water court concluded Denver
could use properly quantified transmountain LIRFs as a substitute supply. The
water court compared transmountain LIRFs to reusable transmountain effluent, which was approved as a decreed substitute supply in Englewood, and
noted that the two are legally indistinguishable. In addition, the water court
reasoned that junior appropriators have no expectation as to imported reusable water because senior appropriators can use and reuse imported transmountain water to extinction. Therefore, junior appropriators could not claim

